Hybrid organizations as a strategy for supporting new product development by Rieple, Alison et al.
48 Design Management Review   Winter  2005
In many industries, such as computer
hardware, aircraft, and car manufactur-
ing, product innovation is a critical
source of competitive advantage. Such
industries have seen increasing numbers
of alliances in recent years and a frag-
mentation of their organizational struc-
tures, so that they resemble networks or
federations. In these types of structures,
firms cut back to their core areas of
expertise and obtain whatever addi-
tional resources they need from spe-
cialists. These developments appear to
have come about as a result of the
increasing awareness of the knowledge
content of innovative products and
recognition that management exper-
tise, as well as organizational culture, is
specialized and not easily transferred
among different product and opera-
tional types.
Within this article, we focus on one
aspect of this type of structure, in
which one firm (normally a large,
multi-product corporation) obtains
critical product-development
resources, such as design or technologi-
cal know-how, from an independent
firm (normally a smaller and more
specialized design consultancy or a
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technology developer). The two firms develop a
fairly close relationship—perhaps only for the
period of a specific assignment, but often over a
longer period spanning several projects. These
hybrid relationships are governed through infor-
mal means, such as unwritten agreements
between key individuals, as much as through the
more usual form of legal contracts.
The new-venture or new-product divisions
that are found within many highly innovative
companies (Procter & Gamble, Nokia, Lucent,
and Sony come to mind; see the box at right) are
another version of the hybrid structure.
Resource acquisition and use
There are three principal methods of acquiring
the resources needed to achieve successful prod-
uct innovations: develop them in-house; buy
them on the open market; or develop them
within strategic alliances or partnerships.
Deciding which structural route to follow
depends on a number of factors: the risk of
opportunistic behavior, the irrevocable commit-
ment of untransferable resources (which may
include ideas, knowledge, and other intangibles,
as well as tangibles such as customized product
components or materials), and the amenability
of such resources to hierarchical control.
However, there may also be a number of
noneconomic influences on such decisions,
including trust and affection, reputation, and
perception about desirable outcomes.
Crucial to the success of a hybrid are “bound-
ary-spanners.” These are members of the partner
organizations who are able to move freely within
both, translating the requirements of each into
language and behavior that is acceptable to, and
understandable by, the other.
Trust between the senior managers who set
up a hybrid in the first place, and the boundary-
spanners who maintain the relationship subse-
quently, is a critical factor. Trust lowers cost and
raises productivity. Cooperation increases under
conditions of trust, because with trust such cost-
ly barriers as formal contracts and detailed mon-
itoring can be removed. The resulting less-for-
mal specifications can also allow the parties to
respond more rapidly to any changes in circum-
stances. Trust may initially arise in response to
the manufactured image and reputation of a
firm and perceptions of its reliability and com-
petence. But it also can develop subsequently
Sony’s innovation structure
Sony is one of the most innovative companies in the
world. Many of its product design functions are carried
out in its local markets, outside Japan, and in its estab-
lished business divisions. However, these activities tend
to focus on improvements to established product
ranges. For more blue-sky developments, Sony has
two types of hybrid product development divisions—
hybrids because they are neither completely
autonomous nor fully governed by the parent. They are
mainly located in Japan and report directly to Sony’s
corporate headquarters. They focus on areas that are
unrelated to current business areas, or on strategic
developments of business areas in which the company
is already involved, such as display or storage technolo-
gies. The more blue-sky the activity, the less control
there appears to be from corporate HQ. Sony’s annual
reports distinguish R&D units described as “headquar-
ters research laboratories” from those called “inde-
pendent research laboratories” with a separate legal
structure. One of these, Sony Computer Science
Laboratories Inc., carries out fundamental research and
research into user interfaces; the other, Sony-Kihara
Research Center Inc., researches three-dimensional
computer graphics and image processing technologies
that combine sensing, image processing, and parallel
computing. Independent though it may be, the
Research Center’s relationship with Sony’s head office
is maintained through Nobutoshi Kihara, who was in
charge of Sony’s research almost from the beginning.
Although he has been retired from Sony since 1988,
he is president of the lab that bears his name. 
Source: Sony’s 2003 and 2004 annual reports
(http://www.sony-krc.co.jp/en/index.htm and
http://eetimes.com/special/special_issues/millenni-
um/companies/sony.html), both accessed 26/1/05.
with frequency of contact, affection, and social
similarity among the people who move between
the organizations—the boundary-spanners, who
are likely to increase in number as the relation-
ship progresses.
Much previous work on the potential misap-
propriation of important product development
resources has examined resources that are
explicitly transferable or have a physical pres-
ence, such as copyrighted or patented designs or
technologies, or product components that can
be bought and sold openly. Less attention has
been paid to intangible resources, such as cre-
ativity and design knowledge, and less still to
resources that are relational and derived from
the synergistic interactions between two or more
people. With such resources, management styles,
systems, and cultural issues are important struc-
tural considerations. In relationships between
two very different organizational types, as is
characteristic of hybrid structures, there is
always the possibility of clashes among process-
es, cultures, and environment.
Entrepreneurial units often resemble those in
a craft organization in which each product is
comparatively unique and the development
process is comparatively random and dependent
on intuition and experimentation. Such units
are often characterized by informal working
practices. This environment is very different
from that of the commissioning firm —typically
a large organization characterized by clearly
defined hierarchical roles and a preference for
planning and rationality in decision making.
Sources of conflict also arise from the nature
of some innovative products, such as furniture
and fashion, the creation of which can be
described as an “expression of difference.” Thus
the creative designer/artist’s attempts to distin-
guish his or her work from others’ can work
against a large economically driven firm’s desire
to maximize the number of units sold. If, by
expressing his or her uniqueness, the artist ends
up appealing to minority tastes or fails to be
familiar enough to be acceptable to decision
makers within the commissioning firm, his or
her ideas are rejected. And yet it is this innova-
tive difference that commissioning firms hope to
capture.
Such clashes hint at some problematic para-
doxes that have to be reconciled, and hybrid
organizational forms are a way of solving them.
Hybrids protect the smaller firm from the sti-
fling effects of the larger firm, while allowing its
creative knowledge to be exploited. This happens
through what is, in effect, a “semi-permeable
membrane” in which certain features are
blocked from movement while others are trans-
ferred. In this process, boundary-spanners have
an important role in translating the require-
ments of the two organizational types to each
other, and protecting some key resources from
the degrading influence of others.
The incompatibility of
resources
As suggested earlier in the case
of Sony, some hybrids develop
within organizations. This is
also the case for 3M and Xerox,
which like Sony have three dif-
ferent types of structures—
blue-sky, product development,
and product improvement. Each
type represents a continuum of
incompatibility of resources and
ownership/hierarchical control
(see Figure 1).
Blue-sky units within a par-
ent organization are likely to
have the same problems of
coordination and integration
faced by inter-organizational
hybrids. And they have similar
benefits. They enable firms to
enjoy economies of specializa-
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Figure 1. Different types of organizational innovation-development structures based on levels of control/independence needed.
tion, without the cultural clashes characteristic
of integrated development. In fact, each partner
has organization-specific resources the other
lacks and needs. The larger or parent firm has
the finances, marketing skills, and promotional
reach to bring a product innovation to market.
Experimentation and market forces over time
make the larger firm an expert at managing its
current customers and operations. For its part,
the smaller firm offers creativity and a knowl-
edge of trends that is critical to the process of
new product development.
We contend that these two types of resources
are complementary and vital to the successful
development of innovative products, but are
essentially incompatible. The smaller firm’s
resources are not easily managed in a hierarchy
without destroying its creative value, and the
possibility of the commissioning firm learning
how to replicate them is forestalled by a number
of culturally embedded factors.
First, new product development is generally
unpredictable and depends on outcomes that
cannot be planned in advance. Hierarchy works
best when the factors to be controlled can be
predicted in advance, usually based on what has
happened in the past.
Second, nonfinancial aims, such as the pur-
suit of a reputation for nonconformity, can be a
major part of a small firm’s raison d’être. This
may be in conflict with the larger firm’s focus on
providing risk-free returns to shareholders. Its
reward and control systems, and its employees’
behaviors, will reflect these priorities.
Third, and linked to the previous point, are
the creative tendencies of innovators. Such indi-
viduals typically have a need to challenge the
status quo; their behavior is not particularly
adaptive. They are driven by intrinsic rather
than extrinsic motivators and do not welcome
being controlled through bureaucratic means. In
order to bring about frame-breaking change,
they have to remain outside existing paradigms
and resist corruption by established interests.
This implies the need for a structural middle
ground, where some protection can be offered to
the creation of difference, while allowing neces-
sary knowledge to be shared.
The culture of the partners in hybrid struc-
tures is thus an important issue, and bringing
those cultures together represents a particularly
potent form of risk. The more homogeneous a
group is, the less risk it undertakes in terms of
coordination, conflict, goal congruence, and
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Innovative technology development
in the motor industry
The motor industry depends on regular injections of
innovation and high-quality design. It is also charac-
terized by a small number of very large consumer-
facing firms that typically contract out many of their
design and product development functions to smaller
specialist suppliers. These companies have often cut
their innovation teeth doing technology development
work for racing teams. 
One of the best known and most respected tech-
nology suppliers is Ricardo, an independent British
firm that has operations around the world and that
works (often secretly) with many major European
and US automobile manufacturers on long-term new
product development projects. Recent examples
include hybrid diesel/electric and advanced fuel cell
engines, and the new Mini for BMW. More than 50
engineers who had been employed at Rover, the cre-
ator of the original Mini, were recruited into Ricardo
to work on the Mini project after BMW acquired the
British car manufacturer (although it subsequently
sold it), allowing valuable knowledge to be trans-
ferred from one firm to the other. In fact, they are
still working for Ricardo. 
Some of Ricardo’s clients are happy to remain
relatively hands-off; others are much more specific in
terms of outcomes and timescales. Many are long-
term clients who have engaged the company to
work on a number of initiatives.
Ricardo has considerable expertise in certain
types of technology. The question is, why have none
of its partners either attempted to develop this tech-
nology in-house, or tried (as far as one knows) to
acquire it? We would argue that resource immiscibili-
ty (that is, its nonmixability— think of oil and
water) is at least partly the reason. 
information flow. But by definition, the ideal
partners in a hybrid will subscribe to different
paradigms and have different experiences,
assumptions, and beliefs. They may even have
different expectations of the relationship.
Bringing two such cultures together in any sort
of tight arrangement is apt to lead to conflict,
misunderstandings, and a swift end to the inter-
action. Key staff from the smaller company
might leave or be less effective as a result of dis-
comfort from working in a more formal envi-
ronment. Structures in such circumstances are
therefore likely to be more effective when they
are semi-permeable, allowing the selective adop-
tion of practices, beliefs, or other organizational
elements.
For example, one of the most common activ-
ities of a bureaucratic firm is to measure profits.
Innovation units cannot easily do that, because
their activities are unpredictable, and time-spans
over which costs and income can be allocated
are nonstandard. If these activities were to be
imposed on the innovation unit, it would proba-
bly wither and die. So there has to be some way
of stopping a parent company, for example, or
an ally (probably a larger company) from
imposing these practices on its partner. The
membrane in this case may be physical (geo-
graphical distance, or separate buildings),
metaphorical (disparate cultures kept apart by
little commonality between members), or con-
tractual (legal definitions of who should do
what). In each case, it is possible for some ele-
ments of various practices to be exchanged or
shared—that is, to be semi-permeable—perhaps
by stipulating some exceptions to normal prac-
tices within a contract, or by the occasional
meeting of people from the two groups.
Other ways of conceptualizing such semi-
permeable structures include the idea of allow-
ing “looseness” at one level of the organiza-
tion—perhaps the project or the team—to coex-
ist with stronger bonds at other levels, such as
senior management. Another way might be to
allow autonomy of local operations, such as the
design process or product prototyping, to be
coupled with strongly defined organizational
objectives or project goals. These structures
allow independence, yet mandate mutual influ-
ence. Figure 2, on the next page, identifies eight
of these loosening/tightening mechanisms.
Setting up this type of permeable membrane
as part of the hybrid structure offers many bene-
fits. The innovators at the smaller firm need to
be allowed to feel they are not selling out or risk-
ing losing their independence because they are
offering their ideas to the larger firm for com-
mercial gain. For its part, the larger firm has to
allow its partner greater freedom and flexibility
than it is used to, and reduce its tendency to
control and measure while simultaneously set-
ting the sorts of output targets that please senior
managers. Semi-permeable membranes preserve
the idiosyncrasies of each partner and maintain
their separate identities.
Such factors are particularly relevant to an
understanding of the role of culturally specific
tacit and explicit knowledge in the management
of the hybrid. For example, process, social, and
experiential knowledge are especially important
in new product development, yet these often
cannot be costed or valued so that they can be
exchanged for resources the commissioning firm
has—cash, for example, or knowledge of market
developments.
Such semi-permeable arrangements have
other benefits besides protecting key resources
from degradation. They serve to buffer aware-
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Categories of Loosening and 
Coupling Mechanisms
Project-Strategy Connections
1. Widely held understandings about what the
organization does: strategy, mandate for inno-
vation, risk climate
2. Technological compatibility
3. Established markets
Project-Organization Connections
4. Funding
5. Senior management attention
6. Structural location
7. Standard operating procedures
8. Human resource deployments
Figure 2. Each of these is “a two-edged sword, bringing needed resources and legitimacy to
the projects and, at the same time, exposing the activities of innovators to scrutiny, interven-
tion, and possible sanctions.” (From Trudy Heller, “Loosely Coupled Systems for Corporate
Entrepreneurship: Imagining and Managing the Innovation Project/Host Organisation
Interface,” from Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, vol. 24, no. 2 (1999), p. 25-31.)
ness of problems. If a prototype in a market test
fails, for instance, the more risk-averse partner
may unfairly perceive the smaller firm as incom-
petent. Such arrangements also allow boundary-
spanners to mediate cultural or strategic misun-
derstandings.
There appears to be a straightforward rela-
tionship between the codification of knowledge
and the costs of its transfer: The more an item of
knowledge or experience can be codified, the
more economically it can be transferred—and,
paradoxically, the less valuable it is. In other
words, tacit, implicit, and socially contextualized
and embedded knowledge is more valuable, but
it is also much harder to transfer and, in fact, is
most easily transferred in a tightly coupled set-
ting. But there is a dilemma here—tight cou-
pling will expose creative staff from the smaller
firm to cultural or operational contamination.
We argue that boundary-spanners have an
important role in solving this problem.
The role of boundary-spanners
Boundary-spanners, or bridgers, as they are
sometimes described, are people who move
between both organizations, translating the
norms of each into language and behavior that
are acceptable to, and understandable by, the
other. There is almost no research on the role
that boundary-spanners have in hybrid organi-
zational structures, and yet they are likely to be
one of the most important factors in the success
of those structures. After all, new product devel-
opment is a social-, collaborative-, and interac-
tion-intensive process involving experimentation
and negotiation over the lifecycle of the new
product’s evolving form, bringing together
knowledge, expertise, and technologies from dif-
ferent sources into a whole. Learning involves
the negotiated resolution of constraints and gen-
erates new knowledge, which may then be
embedded in the design of new technologies,
products, or processes. Thus boundary-spanners
need to be skilled first of all in the nuances of
creating a new product.
Individuals with little experience of working
in a larger company are likely to be unsuitable as
boundary-spanners. They may never have seen
corporate overhead charges, annual plans, safety
rules, or other corporate policy and personnel
regulations. On the other hand, a representative
from the commissioning firm who has never
worked anywhere other than a major corpora-
tion is likely to have little tolerance or under-
standing of the chaotic creativity of small entre-
preneurial units. The most effective boundary-
spanners appear likely to be those who have
worked in small entrepreneurial units, as well as
larger, more bureaucratic firms, though this has
yet to be researched.
Boundary-spanners, particularly in an inter-
national context, need to be able to understand
and transcend the cultural and linguistic norms
of the partners. They need to be able to talk
intelligently about, for example, the psychologi-
cal impact of a product’s color, trends in new
music, or the physiological risks of a new drug,
and translate that understanding into the lan-
guage of discounted cash flows, return on invest-
ment, and net present values. Boundary-span-
ners from the smaller, more creative unit must
be able to convince their colleagues from the
larger partner of the value (economic and strate-
gic) of the project they are
undertaking. They may
need to report on the costs
involved in the product
development process, or to
assess and forecast the time
a particular initiative might
take to reach positive prof-
itability—using, perhaps,
comparisons gleaned from
research carried out in
other firms. Similarly,
boundary-spanners from
the commissioning firm
must be able to reassure the
smaller partner that their
intentions are hands-off
and worthy of trust; at the
same time, they must be
able to clearly articulate the
deliverables to which their
firm will contribute—
design briefs, performance
specifications, and the like.
In addition to being
“bilingual,” boundary-spanners must remain
mindful of the partners’ respective cultures, and
manage potentially conflicting cultural forces—
especially relevant nowadays because of the
global nature of NPD networks. International
hybrids may enable a commissioning firm to
respond to local market needs. However, two
groups separated by a wide cultural divide may
find it hard to verify each other’s credibility, a
potentially important factor in the development
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“Boundary-spanners”
are members of the
partner organiza-
tions who are able
to move freely with-
in both, translating
the requirements of
each into language
and behavior that is
acceptable to, and
understandable by,
the other.
and retention of trust and affection. Boundary-
spanners may need to learn to behave in differ-
ent ways in the two partner environments—to
use a particular body language or wear particu-
lar clothes. Acceptance and trust is more likely to
develop between people who are socially similar
in terms of educational levels, appearance, and
experience. Given the likely cultural distance
between our prototypical creative firm and the
larger commissioning firm, these may be impor-
tant considerations in the choice of boundary-
spanners.
The bridging role is important not only
between organizations but also between the
boundary-spanner and his or her own organiza-
tion’s power-holders. Boundary-spanners are
often called upon to negotiate solutions when
problems arise that are
(inevitably) not covered
by the original agreement.
They are also needed to
get past organizational
road blocks in the partner
organizations. Being
trusted, influential, and
credible are important
factors here. Success is
likely to be based on the
same attributes needed by
inter-organizational
boundary-spanners, but
in this case it also
includes organization-
specific factors, such as
having a successful track record, relationships
with powerful managers, unfulfilled reciprocal
obligations, and access to important informa-
tion.
A perfect example of successful boundary-
spanners can be found in an article in Design
Management Journal written by Tom Mulhern
and Dave Lathrop, of Conifer Research and
Steelcase Inc., respectively. Their article,
“Building and Tending Bridges: Rethinking How
Consultants Support Change,” which appeared
in the Summer 2003 edition of the Journal,
detailed the way in which design consultant
Conifer Research used its methodological
expertise in furniture and workspace design to
improve Steelcase’s product innovation and
organizational performance. Although Mulhern
and Lathrop had not worked together before,
they had “worked around each other” and knew
a lot of the same people. They were both part of
an established network of relationships and rep-
utation, and this is likely to have facilitated the
development of trust between the two organiza-
tional boundary-spanners.
But Mulhern and Lathrop also epitomize the
internal boundary-spanner role. Steelcase had
previously gone out of its way to seek external
perspectives from a “host of brilliant, innovative,
but generally outside resources, with the out-
come generally packaged as a ‘deliverable.’” But
in order to achieve the impact they sought,
Mulhern and Lathrop recognized that their job
would be to inspire insiders to take up the cause.
They described this process as developing “expe-
rience bridges.” To do this, they identified three
key “insider” groups at Steelcase whose engage-
ment would be critical, and they deliberately
focused on involving them in the developing
project. The bridges they established linked peo-
ple, information, and process and thereby “dra-
matically accelerated” progress through the
development of shared understanding.
In any hybrid, there is likely to be a range of
individuals with roles that span boundaries.
Some will be assigned to the relationship for as
long as it lasts; others will be temporary.
However, there is a dilemma here again in that
frequency of contact between key players is
important. It aids the formation of the types of
attachments that minimize opportunistic behav-
ior and facilitate sharing tacit knowledge.
Proprietary knowledge is often a source of
considerable competitive advantage. As we have
argued throughout this paper, bringing together
different types of knowledge is the best way in
which to achieve innovation. However, knowl-
edge has the potential to be misused or leaked to
a third party unless the boundary-spanners are
trustworthy. When there are high levels of
turnover in those who would be boundary-
spanners, or when those who entered the rela-
tionship in the first place are not the same peo-
ple who manage it subsequently, trust needs to
be negotiated again and again. Tenure is very rel-
evant. A high turnover of boundary-spanners
means the discontinuity of specific relationships
and a loss of what is, in effect, relationship-spe-
cific knowledge capital. Yet transferring people
into the hybrid on a short-term basis is a poten-
tially useful method for ensuring that ideas do
not become stale, or that the benefits of an out-
sider perspective, which the smaller unit brings,
do not get lost through over-socialization and
identification.
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Boundary-spanners
are often called upon
to negotiate solutions
when problems arise
that are (inevitably)
not covered by the
original agreement.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have discussed several factors
that appear material to the success of hybrid
organizational structures formed to develop new
products. In these structures, larger firms gener-
ally seek services from smaller independent
units, which develop close relationships with
their partners—sometimes only for the duration
of a specific project, but often over a longer peri-
od spanning several projects. We have highlight-
ed some issues that are currently under-
researched and that we believe deserve more
attention—for example, the need to protect spe-
cialist resources from contamination and the
role of boundary-spanners in dealing with this
problem. We have also identified a number of
circumstances in which it is necessary to bring
together incompatible resources. By bringing
these issues to the surface, we hope to improve
understanding of some of the tensions hybrid
managers are likely to encounter when smaller,
more creative firms associate with larger, more
bureaucratic organizations.
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Note
An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the 2002 British Academy of Management con-
ference and appears in their proceedings.
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